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ABSTRACT
Economies of Scale and Organisation Efficiency
in Banking
Warapatr Todhanakasem, Walter J. Primeaux , Jr
.
,
Morgan J. Lynge.Jr., Paul Newbold*
A number of previous studies have attempted to assess the
extent to which economies of scale exist within banking firms.
Most of these studies have relied upon cost functions of one form
or another and their findings have been inconclusive. A major
difficulty involved in the cost function approach is the
selection of an appropriate measure of bank output.
The profit function and its duality relationship with the
production function offer an alternative approach to examining
economies of scale and organizational efficiency in commercial
banking. This alternative enjoys several advantages over the
cost function method, consequently, that is the approach used in
this study.
A risk adjusted profit function is used in the estimation of
economies of scale of unit and branch banks ; and the effects of
bank holding company affiliation on the level of bank profits is
also examined. The results indicate larger economies of scale
for branch banks than for unit banks and bank holding company
affiliates were found to be more efficient than independent
banks
.
* The authors are Vice President Thai Farmers Bank; and
Professor of Business Administration, Associate Professor of
Finance, and Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ORGANIZATION EFFICIENCY IN BANKING
By
Warapatr Todhanakasem, Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.,
Morgan J. Lynge, Jr., Paul Newbold
INTRODUCTION
After Alhadeff's [1954] pioneering work on bank costs, several
empirical studies were conducted to examine economies of scale in com-
mercial banks. Most of these studies relied upon cost functions of
one form or another and their findings have been inconclusive about the
existence of economies of scale in banking. A major difficulty involved
in the cost function approach is the selection of an appropriate measure
of bank "output." Benston (1965, 1972), Bell and Murphy (1968), and
Murphy (1972) utilzed pnysical measures of Bank outputs in estimating
cost functions. Powers (1969), Longbrake and Haslem (1975), Langer
(1980), and Kalish and Gilbert (1973) used either multiple output
measures or an index with multiple weighted components as a measure of
output. Research results have been highly sensitive to the choice of
output variables.
Development of the profit function and its duality relationship
with the production function offer an alternative approach to the
study of economies of scale and organizational efficiency in commercial
banking. Advocates of this approach explain that it is more desirable
than the cost function because the level of output is not a variable in
the profit function. Furthermore, the procedure also captures a more
complete concept of efficiency than the cost function approach.
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Mullineaux (1978) tested a hybrid profit function which is
transcendental Logarithmic (translog) in labor input prices and
Cobb-Douglas in the prices of output and other inputs and the quan-
2
tities of fixed factors of production. His samples contained banks
participating in the Functional Cost Analysis Program in 1971 and
1972. However, the Functional Cost Analysis data which he used have
often been criticized as not being representative of the banking
industry, since participation is voluntary and most of the data tend
to be from small banks.
The main purpose of this study is to conduct separate empirical
tests of banking economies of scale and organizational efficiency,
utilizing a risk-adjusted profit function on randomly-selected samples
of unit and branch banks. The contributions of the work compared with
previous research consist of the use of more recent data (1978, 1979,
1980), the introduction of elements of risk into the profit function,
and the development of separate estimations for banks operating under
different branching arrangements (unit and branch banks).
PROFIT FUNCTION
The profit function approach offers a convenient analytical tool
which captures both the technical efficiency and price efficiency
dimensions of economic efficiency. Technical efficiency deals with
the quantity of output produced from a given level of inputs. Price
efficiency deals with the quantity of profit produced from a given
3
level of technical efficiency.
Following McFadden (196b) and Lau and Yotopoulos (1971), profit
4
is defined as current revenue less current total variable cost. The
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profit function expresses a firm's maximized profit as a function of
the prices of output and variable inputs and the quantities of fixed
factors. The derivation of the profit function assumes that the firm
is a price-taker in both the output and variable input markets. It
also assumes that the quantities of fixed factors are given. The last
assumption implies profit maximization in the short run, and the pro-
fit function thus derived is called the "restricted profit function."
Duality was developed by Hotelling [1932] , Shephard [1953] , and
Uzawa [1964]. McFadden [1966] later demonstrated that it is possible
to consider only the profit functions in analyses of profit-
maximizing, price-taking firms without explicitly specifying their
corresponding production functions.
In the context of the profit function theory, the goal of an indi-
vidual commercial bank is to maximize profits by taking deposits or
borrowing funds and converting them into various types of earning
assets. Banks also provide other financial-related services, for
example, safe deposit boxes, for fees. In the regular conduct of
their business, banks expose themselves to many kinds of risk.
On the asset side of the balance sheet, assets held by a bank can
be divided into two broad classes: earning assets and non-earning
assets. Given the characteristics and distribution of its liabili-
ties, the bank attempts to structure its portfolio of assets in such a
manner as to yield the greatest return. The higher the percentage of
the bank's total assets held in earning assets, the greater is its
expected profit, ceteris paribus.
-4-
It is desirable to distinguish between the ex ante and the ex post
measures of risk. When granting a loan a bank, can only make a subjec-
tive judgment of the risk of it culminating in default. The higher
the probability of default, the riskcier is the loan and the higher the
rate of interest charged by the bank. The ex ante measures, essen-
tially, are the characteristics of a portfolio that would indicate the
actual performance. If the risky loans turn out to have lower default
rates than expected, the bank will realize higher than expected pro-
7
fits and vice versa.
Most studies of risk have traditionally used the variance or
8
covariances of earnings as measures of riskiness. These measures are
ex post in nature. Rhoades [1981] argued that a good ex ante measure
of the bank portfolio risk is the ratio of total loans to total assets
because it is generally accepted that loans tend to be riskier than
9
other types of assets typically held by a bank.
In the framework of the profit function, the loans to assets ratio
can be viewed as a variable input factor. The higher ratio means
higher portfolio risk exposure. If the cost due to defaulted loans is
high, realized profit for this period will be low, and vice versa.
Banks are exposed to risk on the liability side of their balance
sheets as well. We consider the two broad categories, namely, liabili-
ties and equity capital. For equity capital, the ratio of equity to
total assets has been a popular ratio used by bank regulators as a
measure of bank: soundness. As the ratio rises, the bank's financial
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risk is reduced. For liabilities, as the bank relies less on tradi-
tional (stable) deposits and more on borrowed sources of funds from
the money market, the ratio of borrowed funds to total liabilities
rises and the bank is subject to greater liquidity risk. Management
policy on liabilities and equity capital, therefore, can have signifi-
cant impacts on the risk and profitability on the bank. During
periods of tight money, for example, bank equity capital, as an indef-
inite term-to-maturity source of funds, can reduce the bank's exposure
to high borrowing costs and disintermediation. If banks are faced
with rising short-term money market costs of funds that cannot be
passed on to the borrowing customers through floating rates on loans,
then banks that depend largely on borrowed funds from the money
12
markets may suffer seriously from leverage risk. At other times
general interest rates in the money market may decline and banks may
benefit from access to cheaper costs of borrowed funds.
Over a period of time the bank's ratio of equity capital to total
assets and its ratio of borrowed funds to liabilities can be con-
sidered variable cost factors which, depending on market conditions
and the bank's liability and equity positions, may cause high or low
realized bank profits.
Hence, we use three measures of risk from both sides of the
balance sheet: the ratios of total loans to total assets, equity
13
capital to total assets, and borrowed funds to total liabilities.
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THE MODEL AND DATA
The full Cobb-Douglas specification has properties which make it
convenient for economies of scale estimation. Lau and Yotopoulos
[1971] have proved that, given the Cobb-Douglas production function
conditions, differences in technical efficiency and/or differences in
price efficiency translate into constant differences in the level of
profits, given market prices. They have also proved that a test of
the hypothesis of constant returns in all inputs is a test of the
b
*
hypothesis Z 8. = 1, where the B.'s are the elasticities of the pro-11
1 = 1
14fit function with respect to the fixed factors of production. This
property allows us to test for scale economies or diseconomies by
adding the coefficients of all the fixed factors of production to see
whether the sum is equal to, or larger or small than unity.
The Cobb-Douglas risk-adjusted profit function model that will be
used for our estimations is:
In PROFIT = an + E a.lnP. + E b.lnq. + £ c, InZ,
1=1 j=l J k=l
where P^ are the bank output prices, q are the variable input prices,
including risk factors, and Z, are the quantities of fixed factors.
All data were obtained from the FDIC computer tapes containing
balance sheet and income statement data for all insured banks for
1978-1980. All balance sheet data are measured as annual average
values. The years 1978-1980 were chosen for this empirical work
because during the first two of these years the banking industry had
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returned to a relatively normal operating condition following the tur-
bulent periods during and immediately after the recession of
1974-1975. Interest rates were rising steadily and became much more
volatile in 1980. Competition intensified in several areas of the
banking industry; commercial banks were faced with aggressive com-
petition from the finance companies in the business loan market and
from the thrift institutions and finance companies in the consumer
loan market.
To examine how banks of different sizes and forms of organization
fared during the period of relatively stable economic condition and
increasing competition in the industry, we test two specifications:
Equation for Unit Banks
In PROFIT = lna + b In LRATE + b In ATW
1 2
+ b In INTTS + b In INTCD + b In TLTA
3 4 5
+ b In EQTA + b In BFLB + b In PREM
6 7 8
+ b In TD + b LB + B SWB + b BHC
9 10 11 12
Equation for Branch Banks
In PROFIT = lna + b In LRATE + b In ATW
1 2
+ b In INTTS + b In INTCD + b In TLTA
3 4 5
+ b In EOTA + b In BFLB + b In PREM
6 7 8
+ b In TDBR -I- b In BR + b . Lb + b „ BbtC
9 10 ll 12
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where
PROFIT = total operating revenue minus total operating expenses
LRATE = average rate of interest and fees on total loans
ATW = average total wages per full-time equivalent employee
INTTS = average interest rate on time and savings deposits
INTCD = average interest rate on large certificate of deposits
TLTA = ratio of total loans to total assets
EQTA = ratio of equity capital to total assets
BFLB = ratio of borrowed funds to total liabilities
PREM = bank premises and furnitures and fixtures
PREMBR = average bank premises per branch
BR = number of branches
TD = total deposits
TDBR = total deposits per branch
LB = limited-branching state dummy variable (1 = limited
branching state; = otherwise)
SWB = statewide-branching state dummy variable (1 = statewide
branching state; = otherwise)
BHC = bank holding company affiliation dummy variable (1 =
affliated bank; = independent bank)
These profit function specifications assume that banks are
price takers in output and variable input markets but allow for an
empirical test of this assumption. If banks are not price takers in
the output market, output prices will not be significant explanatory
variables in the profit function. The output price variable, there-
fore, is expected to have a positive and significant coefficient.
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As the theory of the profit function suggests, the expected signs
for the coefficients of the quantities of the fixed factor variables
are positive. That is, as a bank increases its premises, deposits, or
number of branches, profits should increase. The signs for the coef-
ficients of variable input prices other than the risk factors are
expected to be negative. That is, as the variable costs increase
profits are expected to decline.
The expected signs for the coefficients of the risk factors,
however, need some further elaboration. As discussed earlier, the
total loans to total assets ratios (TLTA), as an ex ante measure of
risk, may produce either a positive or negative effect on actual bank
profits, depending on the actual performance of the loans. The coef-
ficient of EQTA is expected to have a positive sign because as the
ratio increases the bank avoids paying "outright" interest as would be
necessary on deposits or borrowed funds. Since our measure of profits
is total revenue less total operating expenses, which essentially is
income before dividend payments
,
the higher the ratio of equity capi-
tal to total assets (EQTA), the higher profit will be. Also, as the
ratio of borrowed funds to total liabilities (BFLB) increases, the
interest payments on borrowed funds grow and this is expected to have
a negative effect on profits. Therefore, a priori the sign for the
coefficient of BFLB is negative.
Most previous studies have suggested that the holding company form
of organization in commercial banking is more profitable than the non-
holding form. These findings are reasonable because bank holding
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companies have access to more diverse business opportunities than
banks which are restricted to only "pure" banking business.
Consequently, the coefficient for BHC is expected to have a positive
sign.
The unit bank sample contains mainly banks from unit banking
states but also include some unit banks drawn from states permitting
limited or statewide branching. A bank which operates a single
office in an environment where some forms of branching are allowed
would be expected to earn lower profits because it fails to exploit
the larger geographical market opportunities and also must face strong
competition from other branch banks. The expected signs for the
coefficients of LB and SWB, therefore, are expected to be negative
for the unit bank equation. For the branch bank equation, only branch
banks located in the LB or SWB states were included in the sample.
It could probably be argued that branch banks in LB states may face
less competition than those operating in SWB states. If this is
correct, branch banks located in the LB states would be expected to
have higher profits.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Unit Banks
The results reported in Table 1 show that the coefficients of the
output price variable (LRATE) consistently take positive values and
are statistically significant. These results are as expected and sup-
port our assumption that banks are price takers in the output market.
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The average coefficient over the three-year period is 1.224, indi-
cating that a 1 percent increase in the average loan rate would yield
a 1.224 percent increase in bank profits. Average total wages per
full-time equivalent employee (ATW), however, has unexpected positive
coefficients for all three years; however, none of the values are sta-
tistically significant.
Variable input prices both of the average interest rates on time
and savings deposits (INTTS) and large CD's (INTCD) have expected
negative coefficients for all years. However, only the coefficient of
INTTS in the 1979 equation is statistically significant.
For the risk factors, the ratio of total loans to total assets
(TLTA) has negative coefficients for all years but is significant only
in the 1979 equation. This seems to indicate that unit banks that
held a large portion of their earning assets in the form of loans during
1979 actually realized lower profits than unit banks whose portfolio
risk was smaller. The ratio of equity capital to total assets (EQTA)
produces the expected coefficients which are positive and statisti-
cally significant. The ratio of borrowed funds to total liabilities
(BFLB), on the other hand, does not have a significant coefficient,
although the coefficient signs are negative, as expected, for two of
the three years.
As for the fixed factors, it is interesting to note that the coef-
ficients of bank premises (PREM) are negative and statistically signi-
ficant. These seem to suggest that, given the level of business, unit
banks either overinvested in fixed physical facilities and equipment,
-12-
TABLE 1
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR UNIT BANKS (a)
Variable 1978 1979 1980 Average
LRATE
ATW
INTTS
INTCD
TLTA
EQTA
BFLB
PREM
TD
LB
SWB
BHC
.915*** 1.046*** 1.712***
(.195) (.159) (.208)
.042 .101 .123
(.099) (.079) (.101)
-.199 -.409*** -.093)
(.141) (.134) (.112)
-.039 -.056 -.003
(.042) (.034) (.045)
-.077 -.138* -.124
(.081) (.073) (.085)
.589*** .780*** 1.109***
(.088) (.079) (.108)
-.010 .013 -.010
(.019) (.017) (.020)
-.163*** -.150*** -.082***
(.028) (.024) (.031)
1.285*** 1.154*** 1.107***
(.042) (.035) (.044)
.042 -.058 .008
(.046) (.041) (.048)
-.060 -.184*** -.162**
(.090) (.058) (.074)
.099** .115*** .202***
(.048) (.038) (.047)
1.224
.089
-.234
-.033
-.113
.826
-.002
-.132
1.182
-.003
-.135
.139
-13-
Variable 1978 1979 1980 Average
Intercept -3.337*** -1.936*** .963 -4.31
(.669) (.577) (.684)
N 547 542 531
J2 .7751 .8139 .7492
S.E. .4577 .3730 .4668
F 157.824 198.107 132.951
(a)
standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at the 1 percent level
** significant at the 5 percent level
* significant at the 10 percent level
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or failed to utilize the premises for the profit maximization objec-
tive. On the other hand, the deposit base variable (TD) has
coefficients that are positive and statistically significant with
magnitudes larger than unity for all three equations. Total deposits,
therefore, provide the sources of loanable funds which help generate
enough profits to offset any tendency toward diseconomies of scale
which may exist in the use of premises.
Overall, the banks turn out to have slight scale economies. If a
unit bank increases its premises and total deposits in the same pro-
portions, the overall economies of scale are 1.122, 1.004 and 1.025
for 1978, 1979 and 1980 respectively, with the average value of 1.05.
These figures indicate that unit banks do enjoy some modest economies
of scale.
The coefficients of SWB and BHC indicate that (1) unit banks in
statewide branching states are less profitable than unit banks in unit
banking states, and (2) banks affiliated with holding companies are
more profitable than independent banks.
Branch Banks
Regression results for branch banks are reported in Table 2. Like
the unit bank equations, the output price variable (LRATE) generates
coefficients which are positive and statistically significant. The
average value is 1.45, slightly above the 1.22 average of the unit
bank equations. Also resembling the pattern results of the unit banks
are the coefficients of (ATW), and the other variable input prices,
the average interest rates on time and savings deposits (INTTS) and on
CD's (INTCD).
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TABLE 2
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BRANCH BANKS^ a )
Variable 1978 1979 1980 Average
LRATE
ATW
INTTS
INTCD
TLTA
EQTA
BFLB
PREMBR
TDBR
BR
LB
BHC
1.236*** 1.293*** 1.837***
(.222) (.290) (.286)
.048 .076 -.103
(.110) (.152) (.119)
.366** -.480** -.269
(.157) (.212) (.237)
-.004 -.111* -.087
(.044) (.060) (.069)
.132 .162 .108
(.103) (.155) (.158)
.863*** .882*** 1.051***
(.085) (.117) (.130)
-.015 -.041 -.030
(.021) (.030) (.036)
-.273*** -.256*** -.267***
(.036) (.050) (.051)
1.359*** 1.316*** 1.289***
(.046) (.061) (.063)
1.049*** 1.023*** 1.004***
(.023) (.033) (.035)
-.025 .031 -.006
(.036) (.050) (.052)
.083** .134** .032
(.041) (.054) (.055)
1.445
.007
-.128
-.067
.133
.932
-.029
-.265
1.321
1.025
.083
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TABLE 2
(continued)
Variable 1978 1979 1980 Average
Intercept -.188
(.794)
509
-2.568**
(1.000)
489
.417
(.997)
478
-2
R .8602 .7685 .7447
S.E. .3965 .5212 .5377
F 261.447 135.984 116.939
-.780
(a) standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at the 1 percent level
** significant at the 5 percent level
* significant at the 10 percent level
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Among the three risk, factors, only (EQTA) consistently yields coef-
ficients with the hypothesized positive signs that are also statisti-
cally significant. Again, these results resemble those of the unit
banks' and suggest that both unit and branch banks realize higher pro-
fits as they use less leverage. (TLTA) and (bFLB), however, do not
generate coefficients which are statistically different from zero.
The coefficients of the three fixed factors (namely, PREMBR, TD8R,
and BR) add up to 2.135, 2.083, and 2.02b for 1978, 1979 and 1980
respectively, with an average of 2.08. These values are approxi-
mately twice those of the corresponding unit bank equations. They
suggest that branch banks realize greater economies of scale than unit
banks and that the major sources of scale economies are the total
deposits per branch and the number of branches. Like unit banks,
branch banks' premises per branch are also the sources of disecono-
mies. Its coefficients are negative and significant for all years
with an average value of -.27.
The coefficients on (LB) and (BHC) indicate that (1) the profit of
branch banks in limited branching states is not significantly dif-
ferent from branch banks in statewide branching states, and (2) branch
banks affiliated with holding companies have greater profit than inde-
pendent branch banks.
Test of Equality of Coefficients
Like other industries, commercial banks experienced changes during
the period 1978-1980. To examine whether the behavior of commercial
banks has changed significantly, tests of equality of coefficients
-18-
were conducted on some variables for both the unit and branch banks.
Applying the normal distribution test of the difference between two
means, with the null hypothesis that the two population means are
equal, the Z-statistic is computed in our case as:
P i(80) P i(78)
z =
/ 2 2S
8
+ S
8
i(80) P i(78)
where 8. /0 n\ = coefficient of variable i obtained from the 1980i(80) .
equation, and
8./-,o\ = coefficient of variable i obtained from the 1978i(78)
equation.
Tables 3 and 4 show Z-statistics and significance levels only for
the coefficients of variables which are statistically significant in
both 1978 and 1980 in the unit bank equations and the branch bank
equations respectively.
Table 3 shows that although the (BHC) variable is not found to
contribute differently to unit bank profits in 1978 and 1980, sta-
tistically the Z-statistics for three other variables, (LRATE),
(EQTA), (TD), are statistically significant at 5% or above and one
variable, (PREM), at the 10% level. Table 1 shows that the coefficient
of (LRATE) almost doubles its original value, increasing from .915 in
1978 to 1.712 in 1980. This is probably the result of banks adjusting
their loan rates upward by amounts greater than the increased cost of
funds. The coefficient of (EQTA) in 1980 is almost double its value in
1978. The coefficients of (LRATE) and (EQTA) in 1978 and 1980, therefore,
-19-
TABLE 3
TEST OF EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS OF UNIT BANKS
Z-STATISTICS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
Variable Z-Statistics Significance Level
LRATE
EQTA
PREM
TD
BHC
2.80
3.69
1.80
-2.83
1.54
.05
.01
.10
.05
TABLE 4
TEST OF EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS OF BRANCH BANKS
Z-STATISTICS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
Variable Z-Statistics Significance Level
LRATE
EQTA
PREMBR
TDBR
BHC
1.66
1.21
.10
-.90
-1.08
.10
-20-
provide some evidence that banks adjust their loan rates quite
promptly and efficiently, while reducing their financial leverage
during a period of rising market rates. Although the coefficients of
PREM and TD are statistically different between 1978 and 1980, the
magnitudes are relatively small. Together, they suggest that the
reduction in economies of scale for unit banks from 1.122 in 1978 to
1.025 in 1980.
As for branch banks, Table 4 shows that only the coefficients of
LRATE are significantly different between the two years. As in the
case of unit banks, this indicates that branch banks also adjust
loan rates upward to a greater extent than the increase in their costs
of funds. Unlike unit banks, however, the coefficients of all other
variables remain statistically unchanged. Therefore, branch banks
appear not to have changed their behavior to the same extent as unit
banks between the years 1978 and 1980.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This work has dealt with the issues related to economies of scale,
economic efficiency, and organizational efficiency in commercial
banks. Through the application of the risk-adjusted profit function,
we have estimated economies of scale of unit and branch banks and
examined the effects of bank holding company affiliation on the level
of bank profits. Separate estimations of unit and branch banks are
more appropriate than the combined estimation because unit and branch
19
banks are basically different in structure and operations.
-21-
Overall, the results of this study indicate larger economies of
scale for branch banks than unit banks. The levels of economies of
scale for unit banks are also found to have declined between 1978 to
1980, although the magnitudes are small. Regardless of the branching
status, bank holding company affiliates are found to be more efficient
than independent banks.
These results have several implications for bank regulators and
managers. Regulators should encourage (or at least not discourage)
the branching form of organization. The greater economies of scale of
branch banks occurs along with the greater number of offices in
18branching states, both beneficial to the bank customer. Achieving
branching via a limited branching arrangement is satisfactory because
of the evidence that no greater efficiency occurs in statewide
branching states. The increased efficiency of banks affiliated with
holding companies should encourage the recent moves toward interstate
banking.
At the bank level, both unit and branch banks should scrutinize
their investment in premises and equipment. The evidence strongly
suggests that banks have over invested in facilities or failed to uti-
lize these physical facilities efficiently.
-22-
Notes
*The authors are vice-president Thai Farmers Bank.; and Professor
of Business Administration, Associate Professor of Finance and Professor
of Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. An
earlier version provides extensive detail of various aspects of the
material shortened in this presentation, including the nature of the
variables in the estimating equation, the data used and characteristics
of the earlier studies. It is available from the authors on request.
See McFadden [1966] and Lau [1969].
2
Majumdar [1980] applied the profit function concept to the study
of economies of scale of the 200 largest commercial banks in the U.S.
in 1977. The profit function equations used, however, consisted of
only one independent variable. Moreover, profit was defined as rate of
return on assets rather than operating revenue minus operating expenses.
A more sophisticated profit function study after Mullineaux can be
found in the work of Richards and Villanueva [1980] which utilized the
Philippines banking data.
3
Lau [Reprint No. 269]: 206.
4
Fixed costs are not considered because they do not affect the
optimal combination of the variable inputs. See Lau and Yotopoulos
[1971J: 97.
See Varian [1978] for more detail. In the short run, some of the
firm's inputs are fixed and only production plans compatible with
these fixed factors are possible. Over the long run, however, these
factors may be variable and the firm's technological possibilities may
change.
There have been a number of theoretical and empirical works on
the relationship between risk and rate of return. For non-bank
studies, see Cootner and Holland [1970] and Fisher and Hall [1969].
For a list of earlier works on risk and rate of return, see Fisher and
Hall, ibid., footnote 1. See also Heggestad [1977] for a similar
study in banking.
From the regulatory viewpoint, bank examiners regularly evaluate
the quality of loans held by banks and formally classify or "criticize"
some of the loans as "doubtful." Wu [1969] attempted to study the
relationship of the "ex ante" data on the quality of bank loans, as
measured by bank examiners criticism, and the "ex post" measure, which
is the subsequent loan defaults. He found that the criticisms were
"relatively accurate as an indicator of bank loan quality."
u
See, for example, Fisher and Hall [1969], Cootner and Holland
[1970], and Heggestad [1977].
-23-
9
Rhoades [1981]: 165.
See Mingo and Wolkowitz [1977]: 120.
See Pringle [1974]
.
12
See Wojnilower [1966] and Heimann [1981].
13
Rose and Scott [1978] use loans/assets, captial/loans , and vola-
tile deposits/liabilities as measures of bank's business and financial
risk.
14
Lau and Yotopoulos [1972]: 13-14.
The number of branches is a measure of plant size. See Richard
and Villaneuva [1980].
1 6
A finding that bank output price makes no significant contribu-
tion to the empirical explanation of banking profits or yields a nega-
tive coefficient would suggest that banks are not price takers or that
the equation is misspecif ied. See Mullineaux (1978): 263.
See, for example, Mayne [1977] and Graddy and Reuben Kyle, III
[1980].
1
8
See Seaver and Fraser [1979]. For earlier related studies, see
Horvitz and Shull 11964], Jacobs [1965], Lanzilotti and Saving [1969],
and Savage and Humphrey [1979].
19
This proposition is also supported by a previous cost function
study by Mullineaux [1975]. tie rejected the hypothesis of identical
coefficients of the variables for branch and unit banks.
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